Alan Musgrave, whose deductivist image of scientific reasoning I will consider in this critical discussion, suggests that, when this occurs, the scientists' argument can be treated either as ampliative, i.e. non-deductive, or as an enthymeme, i.e. as an argument within which additional premisses sufficient to secure logical validity have been left merely tacit.
Musgrave's deductivism resides in his preferring the latter approach. On the former approach, as Musgrave characterises it, scientists' inferences are viewed as following some non-logical inference rule. Musgrave argues that this approach threatens a slide to logical relativism, psychologism, and obscurantism. The deductivist approach, on the other hand, he says is firmly objectivist and non-psychologistic, because it makes (he says) a sharp distinction between matters of logic and matters of fact and accords with a demand for logical perspicuity. The demand to construe scientific argumentation as logically valid deduction is, he contends, reasonable, for it is just the demand to lay out all the assumptions, tacit and otherwise, without which a given conclusion could not have been validly reached. 1 My worry concerning the deductivist image is that actual sciences lack the perfection of logical organisation required for it to ring true. This is not a merely psychologistic point concerning the practising scientists, who will of course often fail to reason logically. Rather it concerns a reason why valid logical deduction is often out of the question in the sciences. To argue this point, I shall consider a science where support for it seems least likely-namely, the most exact and rigorous of empirical sciences, mechanics. My discussion of mechanics ( §4, below) is facilitated by an interchange in Philosophy of Science between Musgrave ("Discussion: Realism about what?", 1992, pp. 691-697) and Roger Jones ("Realism about what?", 1991, pp. 185-202) , and by some recent clarificatory work concerning the physics in these two articles by David Gunn (unpublished manuscript).
The points I make concerning mechanics emerge from consideration of a still more exact and rigorous, though less clearly empirical, science that is closely allied to mechanics, the science of geometry. Even so exact and rigorous a science as geometry lacked, through most of its history, the perfection of logical organisation required for the deductivist image to ring true of it. The historical facts concerning geometry are well known, and they directly imply a problem for the deductivist image of scientific inference. Yet, oddly enough, no-one, so far as I know, has used these facts to evaluate the deductivist image. §2. Geometry before Hilbert a Problem Case for the Deductivist Image. We have a problem case for the deductivist image if, in a scientific discipline, hard-to-state and thus discursively ill-defined thoughtelements nonetheless significantly condition what is accepted as cogent argumentation. That there are such elements in all empirical sciences, including even the most exact and rigorous of empirical sciences, mechanics, I shall argue later. The point will be made to seem less surprising, if we first recall that there are hard-to-state and thus discursively ill-defined thought-elements even in geometry, at least as Euclid formulated it. Not even geometry has long had the perfection of fully discursive expression and logical organisation required for the deductivist image to ring true of it.
That is to say, across all but the last ninety-eight years of Euclidean geometry's two-and-a-half-thousand year history, geometry was not really a logical system. The proof procedures Euclid and all his successors up to Hilbert regarded as rationally cogent, were not the proof procedures of any explicit or even possible discursive deductive logic. Rather, proofs depended crucially on diagrams. The diagrams introduced non-discursive elements, aptly called constructions in intuition, which are essential to the rational cogency of the proofs which Euclid offered us.
It is a common misconception at least of the present day that the system of geometry given us by Euclid is a logical system. I think this misconception has arisen because of advances in logic at the end of the last century. For a while these advances made newly tenable the conception that reason is logic, a conception that had not been ascendant since the heyday of Aristotelianism. Because Euclid's geometry is undoubtedly a rational system, people will mistakenly think it is a logical system if they also think that reason is logic. I am unsure how much confusion there was on this point prior to recent times. I suspect not much. Although the rationalists, it is true, treated Euclid's system as their very ideal for knowledge, in general they did not identify reason with logic. It was the Aristotelians, philosophically more empiricist than the rationalists, who typically equated reason and logic. Aristotelians, unlike rationalists, laid no great store by mathematical knowledge. It was in a perfected system of, say, qualitative zoological knowledge rather than geometrical knowledge that Aristotelians expected to find the logical systematicity which was their ideal for knowledge. NeoPlatonists, who by contrast to Aristotelians worshipped mathematics, and who drew from Euclid inspiration for their radical rationalism, tended to equate reason not with logic but rather with mathematical insight and argumentation. In the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, neoPlatonism helped urge the progenitors of modern science to replace discursive logical modes of reasoning and analysis by intuitive mathematical modes of reasoning and analysis, and thereby replace the qualitative worldpicture of Aristotle by a mathematised worldpicture. Both Galileo and Descartes expressly held that reason is more than logic, and they had mathematics, and in particular geometry, in mind, as the paradigm of rational thought. In his early years Leibniz had attempted to reduce mathematics to logic, just as he had, following Descartes, attempted to reduce physics to mathematics; but he came to view both these attempts as unsuccessful, and to regard mathematics as irreducible to logic from any vantage point but that of the divine mind. Leibniz attempted in his monadology a reconciliation of Aristotelianism and neoPlatonism, and held in effect that reason is the same as logic only for the monad which is highest of all on the scale of apperceptiveness. For all other monads-e.g. for you and me-the rational cogency of geometrical argumentation is not the same as logical cogency. Kant held that reason is not the same as logic, and his philosophy of mathematics was one foundation for this view. Thus it seems that in earlier times thinkers were not apt mistakenly to view Euclid's geometry as a logical system. Why does Euclid's geometry resist formulation as a logical system? Most importantly, because the cogency of Euclidean argumentation is conditioned by the notion of continuity, which resists formal or conceptual definition. The question, "What is a continuum?" in fact is very difficult to answer formally or conceptually. Whatever could the relation of composition be, which holds between a collection of unextended points and an extended, continuous line? Genuine and appropriate puzzlement concerning this question goes back to the Greeks. There is a thickness to the continuum which Zeno helped show is important but which is difficult to lay hold of formally. To reckon to ourselves conceptually the nature of this thickness requires us either (1) to abandon the conception that a continuous extended line is composed of unextended points, or (2) to countenance an infinity higher than that of the natural numbers.
Consider some dense but denumerably infinite collection of points between 0 and 1-for example, the collection comprising 0 and 1 plus their midpoint, the midpoints of the subintervals thus defined, the midpoints of those subintervals and so on. Call this collection [0, 1] .
Although dense, this collection of points has gaps-a remarkable fact.
Thus the point 1 /3 lies on the interval from 0 to 1 but is not a member of [0, 1] . [0, 1] clearly comprises only rational points, but equally clearly comprises not all rational points. The larger collection [0, 1] of all the rational points along the interval from 0 to 1, is, as Cantor showed, itself still denumerable. And [0, 1] , too, has gaps, failing to contain, for example, 1 /π.
A still more remarkable fact than that dense collections can have gaps, is that any denumerable collection necessarily has gaps. Thus, one cannot take a continuum to be comprised of unextended points without countenancing an infinity which is somehow higher than that of the natural numbers. To prove this, one does not need a fully formed theory of the real numbers coupled with the well-known diagonalisation argument of Cantor's. There is a shorter proof: namely, one based on the fact that a denumerable collection of points has measure zero on the continuum.
Suppose that (in Figure 1) I have a section of the continuum, and as well (in Figure 2 ) a dense but denumerable collection of points between 0 and 1 (say, all the rational points). And suppose I want to cut Figure 2 , what total length from the continuum in Figure 1 is it necessary to use? Since in Figure 2 there are infinitely many points to cover, each with a finite hat (which will cover in addition infinitely many points to either side, points which however are themselves to have their own unique finite hat assigned to them as well), it may seem that an infinite total length will be needed. Or, since the points in Figure 2 run densely from 0 to 1, and each is to be covered by its own finite hat, it may seem that at any rate a total length for hats will be needed which is at least somewhat greater than one. The fact is, however, that the total length I need to use for hats is less than any assignable length! For, for any ε > 0, no matter how small, I may, for arbitrary n, cut from the continuum in Figure 1 a hat of length ε / 2 n+1 , to cover therewith the n th member of the enumerable collection of points in Figure 2 . If I do this for all n then the total length used from the continuum in Figure 1 is ∑ all n ε / 2 n+1 = ε / 2 < ε.
Thus the mere denumerability of the collection of points in figure 2 implies that its thickness is as nothing compared to that of the continuum. Thus the continuum itself clearly has more than a denumerable infinity of points.
Until relatively recent times no-one possessed the concept of an infinity higher than that of the natural numbers. which he will then employ in stating his postulates or axioms and in articulating his preliminary propositions and proofs. Euclid then states five postulates and, in addition, five very general principles which he calls "common notions" (see Euclid 1956, pp. 153-155) . Naturally, in order to
give the definitions of point, line, surface, straight, plane, circle, etc., Euclid must make use of some further notions which he leaves merely intuitive and undefined-notions such as length, breadth, extremity, evenly, and inclination. The intuitions which Euclid mobilises in fact call into his reasoning a number of ideas-among them continuity, metric and conformal definiteness, flatness-which for all the centuries until just before Hilbert's day would remain ill-defined because ever-so-difficult to formalise, that is, ever-so-difficult to capture discursively. Hilbert worked of course within a context of thought much changed by the development of non-Euclidean geometries and of more abstract approaches than Euclid's to geometry, and still more significantly, by key nineteenth-century work to rigorise analysis and thus to render discursively clearly, that is, formally rather than intuitively, the idea of continuity.
As is well known, 2 the notion of continuity had long resisted formalisation because it has a logical richness far outstripping the expressive power of Aristotelian logic. From Kant's point of view the project would have seemed an impossible one-to conceptualise something ineluctably intuitive. In hindsight we can see that the project was possible after all, but it was at the same time certainly not easy. To approach the notion of continuity purely formally, i.e. with reasoning that is altogether discursive, we have learned to use such notions as that of the convergence of a sequence and the convergence of a sequence to a limit. With ingenuity we could assign to the terms which Euclid leaves undefined, rather than the standard intuitive meanings, sufficiently nonstandard intuitive meanings (is red for "has breadth", say, and likewise for other undefined terms) that the definitions all come out sensible and postulates and common notions all come out (in some model) true, yet In fact, however, Gödel's proof is but one ground in mathematics for the anti-deductivist conviction that reason ≠ logic. The example of Euclidean geometry itself supports this conviction, in quite another way. §3. A Latent Non-monotonicity in Intuitive Geometric Reasoning.
According to deductivism, "non-monotonic reasoning" is a contradiction in terms. What 'monotonicity' means is that if, given the premisses of an argument, it is reasonable to infer that the conclusion is true, then the addition of more premisses cannot make it unreasonable to infer that the conclusion is true. And so long as we take reason to be deductive-logical in character, the monotonicity of reasonable inference is guaranteed.
Adding premisses to an already reasonable (i.e. logically valid) argument cannot make the argument logically invalid (i.e. unreasonable). For an argument is logically valid if there is no way that the premisses can all be true and yet the conclusion be false. And if there is no way an initial set of premisses can all be true and yet the conclusion be false, then there is no way that an extended set of premises can all be true and yet the conclusion be false.
The example of geometry directly challenges, if I am not mistaken, the deductivist's refusal to countenance non-monotonic reasoning. For there was a latent non-monotonicity in Euclid's reasonings which came to light only in the last two centuries or so and was fully disclosed only by Hilbert's work. This is a point I want briefly to explore before I move on from geometry to mechanics, and thus from mathematics to an empirical science. problem. At least, it is notoriously problematic whether discrimination of relevance relationships could ever take the form of formal manipulations on symbol strings. Since in principle, anything could change as the result of any other change, discriminating when "other things are equal" from when they are not seems to call all at once upon total knowledge. Our way of discerning relevance relationships apparently links to a holism or globality in cognition, a feature of cognition which we have good reason to suspect could not possibly be mechanical or thus merely logical. Our way of discerning relevance relationships seems to involve a generalised "feeling" we have for the kind of world we're set into. Such feelings involve intuitions which gather together into a unitary certain features of ourselves and of our world-features which resist discursive codification.
For example, such undefined intuitive notions as "length", "breadth"
and "evenly" get their content from gestures we make with our hands, things we can do with blackboard diagrams, calculations we can make, and many other skills. A remarkable fact concerning our cognition is that these diverse and multifaceted skills, these varied features of our way of Now whenever reasoning is non-monotonic I think it depends on a feeling for the kind of world one is set into: it depends on discriminations of relevance. Euclid presented geometry as a closed rational system, but the reasoning it involves makes use of intuition. Euclid depended on a common feeling we all have for our world's spatial form. This dependency is present in virtually all the reasoning he takes us through.
As it happens, the feeling we have for our world's spatial form is less fixed than Euclid imagined. This points to something unsatisfactory in Euclid's approach. Hilbert as I have mentioned made out how Euclidean geometry could be captured as a rational system in a sense involving rationality or reasoning of a wholly monotonic sort. In consequence, Hilbert's theory of geometry has no necessary link to intuition. Hilbert said that if you like you can take beer mugs or coffee tables as points or lines: geometry doesn't depend on there being any particular meanings for its terms, for it is a set of formal operations on symbol strings. Intuitive meaning is out of the window. That is, the complete formalisation of formerly intuitive notions allows their entire content to be carried syntactically, in the logical import of appropriate, fully discursive, axioms.
Thinking which has not reached such a state of formalisation in general will inevitably involve those inference moves which traditionally have been counted contrary to the deductivist image: analogy, induction, ceteris paribus deduction. Inside geometry as Euclid had fashioned it, only commonalities in our feeling for the world's spatial form enter our reasonings. The reasonings seem timeless, and Euclid makes them seem as cogent as any other reasonings from mathematics. This is why the nonmonotonic character of Euclid's reasonings was hard to discern, and his science was regarded as at the furthest remove from inductive or empirical science. When we consider empirical science, we concern ourselves with relations and affections among enduring but changing things. Here again there is much that is common in our feeling for relevant similarity and dissimilarity. A proponent of the deductivist image of scientific inference will seek to reconstruct any reasonings as deductively valid in form: for example, a deductivist will take the inference to Deductivists reconstruct all inferences in the sciences as logically valid. To accomplish this, they will often stray so far into artifice as to lose proper contact with the thinking of scientists. It is always possible to insist upon the deductivists' reconstruction, but as the foregoing discussion shows, this insistence can be forced and so both unhelpful and implausible.
To sustain the doctrine that rational inferences are always logically valid discursive inferences requires such stubborn adherence to it that the doctrine is rendered analytic. In short, deductivists can maintain their position only by trivialising it. Perhaps the lesson we learn from studying these alternative formulations of Newtonian mechanics is that the real character of this theory is more exquisite than that of any one such "framework" which we can fathom. That is, there is a difficulty of categorization, so that we are faced with a considerable gulf between the physical laws we may actually establish and the intuitive physical conceptions in terms of which we reckon to ourselves the significance of these laws. As we bring the theory into logically better perfected form, we may expect to learn that none of the categories thus far invoked are essential to it. Physicists themselves seem to adopt this attitude, for example, when they make out the commitments they assume on accepting and using a given theory, as pertaining just to the symmetries the theory has. This betokens a realism about structure, which is however aloof from ontology. It is a refusal to be drawn on questions which Jones and Musgrave consider important.
On the other hand, it is perhaps too early to tell whether the frameworks which seem so different from one another are or are not It seems a sure thing that there are strong connections between these alternative formulations, since in the case of some systems (pointparticle systems), it is possible to make out a mathematical link which is so tight that the difference between one and the other seems merely a difference of terminology. A problem, however, is that this class of systems is special and in fact especially unrealistic. In reality there are no systems of point particles. Realistically, every mechanical system comprises matter densities over continuous regions rather than discrete assignments of finite masses to (merely denumerably many) points, and every system involves dissipation of mechanical energy into heat. In the case of dissipative continuous systems it seems impossible to follow similar considerations to the conclusion that the alternative formulations are alike in meaning (for the terms of one of the formulations simply cannot be used). Consequently we have inadequate grounds at present to call the alternative formulations mere terminological variants of one another.
To demonstrate that two formulations of the intuitive theory of mechanics are mere terminological variants of one another, we need (on a syntactical approach) to show that merely by supplementing the sentences of one formulation with some terminological definitions (sentences which carry no content), and thus appropriately extending the language in which this first formulation is couched, we can deduce all the sentences comprising the second formulation, and conversely. Alternatively (on a semantical approach) we would need to prove in terms of the models of Neither the former, syntactical task nor the latter, semantical task will be successfully carried out without there first occurring some great advances in the formalisation of the theory of mechanics. For either task to be completed successfully, we first need someone to solve Hilbert's sixth problem (for mechanics). Only then could the present formulations of the theory of mechanics, be rigorously compared as to likeness of meaning. As is well known, very limited success has so far been achieved in efforts to solve Hilbert's sixth problem. 5 So we are at present in no good position rigorously to compare the alternative formulations of Newtonian mechanics as to likeness of meaning.
A symptom of the poverty of our present-day understanding of mechanics is that we are unable to view the theory as Hilbert could geometry, as just a logically articulated set of sentences. In the present state of our knowledge, it seems better to adopt some other, non-syntactic, Perhaps we could smooth the way for formalised treatments of understanding as unification by bringing the presentation of some physical theories into logically more perfected form. In the foregoing I have not disparaged such work, but simply noted that it is hard (and that even the bare possibility of eventual success is not guaranteed). That there is a place for such work seems to me, for reasons I have briefly canvassed, to validate the positivist program in the philosophy of contemporary science, for their sense of the importance of such work was I believe for the most part accurate. Realism, too, has value in so far as we seek discursive clarity because we want to understand as best we can the way things really are, and this aim importantly conditions our practices even if it is painfully hard to achieve. Constructivism with its emphasis on paradigms, skills, non-discursive elements of thought in science, and so on, also has value, as
shown. Deductivism attracts allegiance in the first two camps, and antipathy from the last one. In my view the question about the camps is not which is right, for in order adequately to illuminate science one evidently must draw insights from each of them. Likewise in my view the question about deductivism is neither whether we are to build upon it an entire adequate self-consistent view of science, nor whether to build such an encompassing view of science requires its rejection. Deductivism is a philosophical thesis, which stresses ideals of discursive clarity and logical comprehension. These ideals are operative in the sciences, but only imperfectly so. Deductivists provide insights without which I expect we would not illuminate actual science adequately. I believe also, however, that the insights of some anti-deductivists are likewise indispensable. §6. Conclusion. I have argued that there are problems even in the most rigorous and exact of sciences for the deductivist image of scientific reasoning. The general lesson which I believe should be drawn, is that the reconstruction of science should not follow upon a philosophical decision to be a deductivist or an anti-deductivist (or indeed a realist or an antirealist). It is better to approach science armed with the insights of deductivists and anti-deductivists, realists and anti-realists. Adequate illumination of actual science seems to require all these insights.
